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Abstract. On the one hand, Dignāga supposes in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (part 1) that 
immediate perceptual experience at every given moment has as its object something 
that never goes beyond its own actually present content and thus may characterise only 
itself (svalakṣaṇa). In that respect, svalakṣaṇa appears as a kind of mere presence, sheer 
momentary actuality. It cannot undergo any external influence or exercise its own influ-
ence on other svalakṣaṇas. In other words, it cannot be extended to things other than 
itself, as is the case of mental constructions. First, I would like to ask whether there is 
a potentiality in the act of immediate perception according to the Pramāṇasamuccaya. 
On the other hand, in the Ālambanaparīkṣā, cognition is an entirely interior process 
that proceeds, without the help of any external object, from a potentiality (śakti) that 
manifests itself as a sense organ to an internal cognisable form. Second, I would like to 
dwell on the question concerning whether an immediate perception of svalakṣaṇas, free 
from mental constructions, is still possible in the Ālambanaparīkṣā.
The opposition of potential-actual, or potentiality-actuality, was introduced into the 
Western philosophical lexicon by Aristotle. He used the terms dunamis (capacity, 
force, power) and energeia or entelecheia (act). In general terms, potency is a ca-
pacity, and actuality is realisation/fulfilment/action/presence, etc. In Indian thought, 
we find a certain number of terms that have more or less the same meaning, first 
of all the opposition of avyakta-vyakta (unmanifested-manifested, or latent and 
manifested), then several terms for potential without any established counterpart 
(pratiyogin) for actuality, like, for instance, śakti (ability, capacity, power, force) 
and sāmarthya (capacity), and for actualisation or realisation we can use kriyā, 
vyāpara, pravṛtti, and karitra. As for the philosophical developments of this theme, 
what first comes to mind is the ṣāṃkhya, with its prakṛti that evolves from avyakta 
(unmanifested state) to vyakta (manifested state). Some reflections of this opposi-
tion could be found in many other schools, as, for example, the early Vaiśeṣika list 
of categories in the Daśapadārthaśāstra contained śakti and aśakti. In almost every 
system of classical Hindu and Jain philosophy, we may find some suggestions con-
cerning this opposition. 
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But in this paper I want to dwell on the Buddhist concept of potential-actual, 
particularly on their understanding of perception. I will take as an example Dignāga’s 
doctrine of immediate perception (pratyakṣa).
I start with outlining the context in which the problem of potentiality and ac-
tuality may arise. The general Buddhist idea could be formulated as follows. True 
reality is change (anityatā). The Buddha said that all complex things are subject to 
destruction, so we can assume that things have the potential to undergo destruction. 
Abhidharmikas have formulated this maxim in a much more radical way: change 
takes place every moment (kṣaṇa). The mainstream Vaibhashikas maintain that every 
moment there is an appearance (utpatti, janma), duration (sthiti), degradation (jara), 
and vanishing (vinaśa) of phenomena (dharmas). Sautrantikas argued that a moment 
is tantamount to the origination of dharma presupposing the disappearance of the 
dharma of the previous moment, or some of them held that at every moment there is 
a disappearance of dharma. For them a true reality, that is the reality of the dharmas, 
is only something actually present. What then remains of the potentiality? Does it 
disappear altogether? 
This supposition is absolutely untenable since it runs counter to Buddha’s most 
important discovery, which is the principle of overwhelming causality: all events 
arise and disappear depending on their causes and conditions (hetu, pratyaya). This 
causality was for Buddhists thinkers a sort of philosophical justification of karma, 
since with its help they tried to explain in what way our past actions determine our 
present condition, and even more importantly, how our actual behaviour produces an 
impact on our future. For Buddhists every action made with some intention is loaded 
with retributive potency that is actualised when this same type of action—skilful or 
unskilful—is reproduced in the future. Let us suppose that this action is a cognitive 
act. How does it happen within the frames of momentariness? 
The first systematic Buddhist concept of perception was developed by the pa-
triarch of Buddhist epistemological tradition, Dignāga. But Dignāga’s understand-
ing of perception is developed in the context of tradition based on some important 
Abhidharma Buddhist concepts. Among them: 
1. The idea formulated in the earliest Buddhist texts of the Sūtra-piṭaka that in per-
ception there are three constituting factors: the object of sense (viśaya), faculty of 
sense (indriya), and cognitive function appropriate to this organ—perceptual dis-
cernment (vijñāna). In canonical terms, the object is the external basis (āyatana) of 
perceptual discernment and the faculty of sense is the internal basis of perceptual 
discernment. Each kind of sense faculty has its own kind of object and perceptual 
discernment (the organ of vision refers only to colour and forms and is supported 
by a visual awareness, etc.). Each of the six varieties of perceptual discernment 
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(visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory) may serve as a mental organ (manas) 
for the subsequent moment of the mental discernment (manovijñāna).
2. The concept of dharmas (different interpretations: phenomena, micro-events, fac-
tors of becoming, elements, tropes), constituting series to which all individual 
experience, including cognitive experience, has to be finally reduced. 
3. The concept of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda), according to which a perceptive act 
is a momentary cognitive event.
There are two main causal explanations of the momentariness in a cognitive pro-
cess: first, simultaneous causation (sahabhū, like lamp and light) based on what we 
may call the intentional model of cognition (cognition is always directed at an object), 
so the object of cognition arises simultaneously with the act of cognition. Second, a 
sequential model of causation: there are causes, the results of which are the later mo-
ments in the same category of phenomena (sabhāga-hetu), like seed and sprout: in 
that perspective an object engenders its cognition. Both cases entail difficulties: in the 
first case, a relationship between cause and effect could not be established with regard 
to simultaneous events; in the second case, at the moment of cognition the object is 
already gone. Vaibhaśikas allow both models: certain causes (hetu) and conditions 
(pratyaya) arise prior to their effects, while others arise simultaneously with them. 
Sautrāntikas believe that the cause must precede its effect.  Contrary to Vaibhaśikas, 
they do not recognise either past or future dharmas; for them only present dharmas 
are real (dravya). Does that mean that they do not recognise any potential factors? Let 
us remember that with a loss of potentiality karmic causality cannot be explained. 
The potentiality in the Sautrāntika doctrine was represented by the idea of bīja (seed) 
and vāsanā, as well as with the doctrine of santanti-parināma-viśeṣa—a decisive 
transformation in the series of bīja that generates the effect. Every perceptive act 
with regard to any object leaves its seed, which is activated in future experience due 
to the encounter with a similar object. Thus, actual perceptual experience consists in 
the actualisation of the seed (potential). 
These are—presented in a very brief and simplified form—the elements of epis-
temological themes formulated before Dignāga.
Dignāga’s personal contribution is—among other things—the concept of 
svalakṣaṇa. He specially highlights that perceptual experience at every given moment 
has as its object something that never goes beyond its own actually present content 
and thus may characterise only itself (the literal meaning of the word svalakṣaṇa). It 
is evident that for Dignāga, contrary to Vasubandhu, svalakṣaṇa was not a specific 
characteristic of dharma according to which it may be classified into one of the 75 
categories; it was a dharma itself in its utmost nature that could not be described or 
defined in words. We have only one clear reference to the nature of svalakṣaṇa in the 
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Pramāṇa-samuccaya: ‘The object of sense is form (rūpa), which is to be cognised 
[simply] as it is and which is inexpressible’ (PS 1.5cd).
For this reason, perception for Dignāga can be only a direct, immediate experi-
ence without mental constructions (kaplanāpodha). Mental constructions belonged to 
another instrument of valid knowledge—anumāna (logical inference)—which was 
directed towards objects having common features (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). In that respect, 
svalakṣaṇa appears to be a moment of mere presence, sheer actuality. No factor ex-
ternal to it can introduce itself into it and vice versa; it cannot interfere with other 
factors. In other words, it cannot be extended to things other than itself, as happens in 
the case of mental constructions. 
We cannot find any positive definition of pratyakṣa in the PS, but Dignāga tells us 
what is not pratyakṣa—mental projecting or constructing (kalpanā). In general, for all 
Indian philosophers what is most valuable in pratyakṣa is its vividness, clearness, and 
immediate access to reality. All these characteristics, in my opinion, reveal the unde-
niable impact of the mystic, intuitive experience. It is especially true in Buddhism, 
where the experience of bodhi (awakening) of the Buddha himself was at the centre of 
the whole doctrine. Even later, when Buddhist philosophers like Vasubandhu, Asanga 
and Dignāga began to be interested in the study of, say, ordinary perception, the im-
mediacy persisted as its ideal. It was clearly formulated by Dignāga’s greatest com-
mentator, Dharmakīrti, in his Pramāṇaviniśaya:
A cognition (jñāna) that does not go against reality and that, due to the force of meditation, 
manifests itself clearly, as in the case of fear etc., is a perception free from mental construc-
tions. (PV 28)
Vṛtti: Yogins also, having grasped objects through oral instruction [while studying the 
Śāstras] and having established consistency (yukti) [of this knowledge] through reasoning 
(cintāmaya), proceed with meditation and [when this meditation] attains its culmination 
(niṣpatti), that what appears clearly, like fear, etc. [when an ordinary person is extremely 
frightened], non-erroneous and free from mental constructions is a perception, an instru-
ment of valid cognition, like the direct experience of noble truth [by the Buddha] described 
by us in the Pramāṇavārttika. (See PV 2.147–280)
What then is Dignāga’s svalakṣaṇa—an object itself or its image? (1) If it is an 
object, in that case the content of perception is fully determined by a factor external 
to the individual karmic series (santāna). (2) If the svalakṣaṇas are mental reflec-
tions (ābhāsa) of the object that simply take its form (the sarūpya principle), a type of 
sensory information, the situation remains the same, because in that case these sense-
data are still totally determined by their cause—the external object. The first position 
described above is that of the Vaibhaśika and its nirākāravāda (cognition is without its 
own form; it simply reflects the object), and the second is that of the Sautrāntika and its 
sākāravāda (cognition has its own form that is congruent with the form of the object). 
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If our cognitive content is determined only by external objects beyond our indi-
vidual series, how can we account for the karmic causality that constitutes the in-
ternal process? If we accept karmic determination to be the ruling principle of our 
perceptual experience, there arises a question as to its immediacy: immediacy is, by 
definition, a relation between something interior (our awareness) and something ex-
terior to it (objects or sensory information).
It is evident that svalakṣaṇa is postulated in the PS but not sufficiently explained. 
We can only guess what its ontological commitment may be—whether it is an ex-
ternal object or its mental representation—a type of sensory information—or both. 
Whatever it may be, it is certainly understood as something unique and new. If we 
apply the machinery of karmic determination to it, can it preserve its uniqueness and 
novelty?
Let us turn to Dignāga’s famous text Ālambanaparīkṣa, where this karmic machin-
ery perpetuating a transformation from potential seeds to actual perceptive experi-
ence is exposed in its clearest form. Ассording to this text, cognition is an entirely 
interior process that proceeds from a potentiality (śakti) that manifests itself as an 
organ of sense to an internal cognisable form (antarjñeyarūpa): 
The cognition depending on the potentiality called ‘eye’, etc., as well as on the internal 
[cognisable] form, arises with an image of the object regardless of an [external] object. 
Both [internal form and potentiality] are mutually caused and have no beginning in time. 
(Vṛtti to kar. 8)
Thus, the actual perceptive act arises dependent on the previous perceptual ex-
perience that, in its turn, is determined by the faculties and their correlative interior 
objects. The entire process is supposed to be determined by a person’s individual 
karma, which creates patterns (vāsanās) of one’s likes and dislikes, embodied cogni-
tive schemas including linguistic competency and categorisations. 
One may ask whether an immediate perception of svalakṣaṇa free from mental 
constructions is still possible under such conditions. I think it is not for two reasons: 
first, there is no svalakṣaṇa as some unique, new, and self-defining phenomena. At 
this level of reality, from the Yogācāra point of view, the dependence of everything 
on something else—paratantra—is put to the fore. The role of dharmas as specifying 
factors seems to lose its importance at this level. While in classical Abhidharma the 
notion of dharmas is primarily that of the specifying factors of mental experience, 
here the accent is made not on their capacity to qualify mental events but on their 
total relativity and interdependency.
Second, the experience of the immediate presence (sākṣatkaritva) of some exteri-
or thing is treated as just an illusion. As Dignāga notes, ‘In the absence of an external 
object, only that interior [form] (antas) manifesting [something] that looks like the 
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exterior [thing] (bahirvad) is an object-condition [of cognition]’ (vṛtti to kar. 6: bahye 
‘rth’sti bahirvadabhāsanam-antas-sad-eva-ālambana-pratyaya). 
In Dignāga’s works we therefore find, in fact, two approaches to the problem of 
potentiality and actuality. The first approach, which may be called phenomenological, 
is conceived after the model of immediate yogic perception. It consists of the direct 
access of a non-propositional perception either to an external object or to its mental 
representation (the ‘Pratyakṣapariccheda’ of PS gives no clues to the definite choice 
between these two possibilities). This approach is associated with the stress on the 
actual experience of the present moment. The second approach takes account of the 
karmic process of causation and for this reason it highlights potentiality (AP). In the 
Viṃśatikāvṛtti of Vasubandhu, which quite evidently influences the AP, there is no 
place for immediate perception. 
16. 16а. The cognition of [what is] before one’s eyes [takes place] as in a dream, etc., even 
without an (external) object as has been stated before. 
16b. When it [takes place, its] object is not seen. How could it be immediate?
When that (cognition), called immediate, arises [in the form] ‘this is present be-
fore my eyes’, its object is no (longer) seen, and this judgment is made only with the 
help of mental cognition (manovijñāna) because the visual discernment by that mo-
ment has stopped. Taking this into account, how can the character of being immedi-
ate be postulated, especially with regard to an instantaneous object like form-colour 
(rūpa) or taste, etc. that [at the moment of judging ‘this is present before my eyes’] 
has already ceased to be?
In this text, Vasubandhu acknowledges only perception of the mental kind 
(manovijñāna) that is not immediate at all, although the opponent’s question was 
about immediate perception. 
It seems to me that Dignāga’s position towards immediate perception, according to 
the logic of the AP, may be the same.
How can we explain this fact? Is there an inconsistency or contradiction between 
the AP and PS? I do not think so. I propose to understand these two approaches in 
terms of upāya kauśalya—skilful means. In the PS, Dignāga tried to present a doc-
trine of perception to compete against the doctrines he criticised in the next section, 
which are mainly realistic. At this parikalpita (imagined/empirical) level, he resorts 
to some common principles of realistic epistemologies. That is why, in my opinion, 
he did not exclude the existence of external objects (in the form of atoms, which fol-
lows from the PS 1.4).1 The AP, as it has come down to us, seems to correspond to the 
1  As Hattori translates k. 4cd: ‘[t]here [in the above-cited Abhidharma passages], that [percep-
tion], being caused by [the sense-organ through its contact with] many objects [in aggregation], 
takes the whole (sāmānya) as its sphere of operation in respect to its own object (40). Since it [viz., 
perception] is caused by [the sense-organ through its contact with] many substances [viz., atoms in 
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paratantra (dependent) level of reality, so these two expositions are simply intended 
for different purposes—for persons with different levels of spiritual and intellectual 
background.
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